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1  INTRODUCTION 
Is understanding why p simply knowing why p? Duncan Pritchard argues that it is not.1 According 
to him, understanding-why has two features that set it apart from knowledge-why. Unlike 
knowledge-why, understanding-why is compatible with environmental luck and it is a kind of 
cognitive achievement in a strong sense (short: CAS) (Pritchard 2008, 2010, 2014; Carter and 
Pritchard 2015). I am concerned with the second thesis which involves two claims:  
 
(U-WHY = CAS) Understanding-why is a kind of CAS.  
(K-WHY ≠ CAS) Knowledge-why is not a kind of CAS.  
 
Pritchard’s arguments target knowledge-why and understanding-why in regard to causal matters. 
For the sake of simplicity, I follow this restriction. Moreover, his arguments are based on a thesis, 
which I do not question for the sake of argument: 
 
(K-THAT ≠ CAS) Knowing that p is not a kind of CAS. 
 
One of Pritchard’s argument for (K-THAT ≠ CAS) is that knowledge-that can be acquired via 
testimony (more on that later). His argument for (K-WHY ≠ CAS) is then straightforward: Knowing 
                                                        
1 For other defenses of anti-reductionism about understanding-why see, e.g., Zagzebski 2001; Kvanvig 2003; 
Elgin 2007; Hills 2009, 2016; Dellsén 2017. For defenses of reductionism see, e.g., Lipton 2004; Grimm 
2006, 2014; Khalifa and Gadomski 2013; Kelp 2014; Riaz 2015; Sliwa 2015. 
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why p is commonly analyzed as a form of knowledge-that. Knowing why p is to know that (p 
because q), for some q.2 Such knowledge can be also acquired via testimony. Thus, (K-WHY ≠ CAS). 
Pritchard’s argument for (U-WHY = CAS) is based on two assumptions: (i) Having a sound 
explanatory story regarding how cause and effect are related is a necessary requirement for 
understanding-why. (ii) Having (p because q) information is not equivalent to having such an 
explanatory story. He then argues that having an explanatory story regarding how cause and effect 
are related is a kind of CAS and that therefore (U-WHY = CAS).  
These arguments can be questioned in at least two different ways. Stephen Grimm (2006, 
2014), Christoph Kelp (2014), and Paulina Sliwa (2015) argue that coming to believe that (p because 
q) also requires having an explanatory story regarding how cause and effect are related. If they were 
right, Pritchard’s argument for (K-WHY ≠ CAS) would fail, according to his own criteria. If having an 
explanatory story regarding how cause and effect are related is a kind of CAS, then (K-WHY = CAS) 
and (U-WHY = CAS). Grimm (2012), Daniel Whiting (2012), and J. Adam Carter and Emma Gordon 
(2014) argue that having an explanatory story regarding how cause and effect are related is not a kind 
of CAS. If so, Pritchard’s argument for (U-WHY = CAS) would fail. Then, it seems that (K-WHY ≠ 
CAS) and (U-WHY ≠ CAS). Either way, being a kind of CAS would not be a feature that sets 
understanding-why apart from knowledge-why. So, the crucial questions are: Does acquiring (p 
because q) information require having an explanatory story regarding how cause and effect are 
related? Is having an explanatory story regarding how cause and effect are related a kind of CAS? 
In this paper, I argue that both questions should be answered in the negative. After introducing 
the concept of a CAS (section 2) and after presenting Pritchard’s argument for (K-WHY ≠ CAS) in 
more detail (section 3), I first elaborate on the explanatory story requirement (section 4). Having a 
sound explanatory story regarding how cause and effect are related is to have information about 
facts or principles that establish the causal connections between the phenomena in question. Then, 
                                                        
2 I use round brackets to avoid scope ambiguities with respects to ‘know’. 
  
3/33 
I make a positive case for the claim that coming to believe that (p because q), for some q, does not 
require having a sound explanatory story regarding how cause and effect are related, and I rebut 
Grimm’s, Kelp’s, and Sliwa’s arguments against this claim (section 5). (p because q) information is 
typically just information that some explanatorily relevant dependency obtains. So, if knowing why p 
is to know that (p because q) and if (K-THAT ≠ CAS), then Pritchard is right that (K-WHY ≠ CAS). 
Then, I argue that having a sound explanatory story regarding how cause and effect are related is not 
a kind of CAS (section 6). Although the arguments given by Grimm, Whiting, Carter and Gordon 
can be rebutted, there is a clear-cut argument for this claim: One can acquire at least some relevant 
explanatory stories via testimony. Hence, Pritchard’s argument for (U-WHY = CAS) fails. The bottom 
line of my paper is thus that being a kind of cognitive achievement in a strong sense does not set 
understanding-why apart from knowledge-why. It seems that (K-WHY ≠ CAS) and (U-WHY ≠ CAS). 
However, if knowing why p is to know that (p because q), for some q, we have identified an 
alternative feature that sets understanding-why apart from knowledge-why: The minimal condition 
for understanding-why and knowledge-why with respect to their contents is not identical. Knowing 
why p merely requires information that some explanatorily relevant dependency obtains. 
Understanding why p additionally requires information about facts or principles that establish the 
explanatory connections between the phenomena in question. 
2  COGNITIVE ACHIEVEMENTS 
Reaching the top of Ben Nevis on foot is a paradigmatic case of an achievement. However, defining 
the notion achievement or cognitive achievement has proven to be a demanding endeavor. Here, I don’t 
discuss its challenges (see, e.g., Turri 2011; Greco 2012; Carter, Jarvis, and Ruben 2015; Navarro 
2015). Instead, I introduce an account along Pritchard’s lines.  
The term ‘cognitive’ shall include all mental processes, such as reasoning, processing stimuli, 
and memorizing. Cognitive achievements are cognitive successes. Pritchard equates cognitive 
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successes with true beliefs (Pritchard 2014, p. 319). This is too narrow a conception. Counting 
flawlessly to 1000 and mental simulations are also cognitive successes. But for the question at hand 
a narrow conception suffices because, arguably, success in the case of knowing why p and 
understanding why p is to have true beliefs as to why p. A success is a particular outcome of an activity, 
namely its realized aim (broadly understood). The term ‘aim (broadly understood)’ shall include 
directed activities that do not involve a goal in the narrow sense, for instance, instinctive activities 
or en passant activities, such as processing the colors of items en passant. The outcome must stand in 
a particular relation to the activity to count as an achievement: First, the activity must contribute to 
realizing the outcome roughly as intended. For instance, when I start raising my arm someone else 
cannot finish lifting it, if the raised arm is supposed to be my achievement. Second, the activity must 
not be done in a random way, but it should be an exercise of a relevant ability (Pritchard 2014, p. 
318). For instance, if someone hits the bull’s eye by randomly using a bow we would hesitate to call 
this an achievement. Third, the activity must be the decisive factor for accomplishing the outcome. 
Just being a decisive factor would not be enough. Many factors contribute to realizing an outcome, 
such as the materials used. What the decisive factor amounts to is not observer-independent, as 
Greco emphasizes (2012). What we consider decisive are often the salient or unusual things. 
Defining the notion of the decisive factor in more detail has proven to be challenging (for proposals 
see, e.g., Turri 2011; Greco 2012). For our purposes, a rough outline suffices: Successes are 
excluded that involve so-called intervening luck. The peculiarity of such luck is that it intervenes in the 
causal chain of the process. One example is an archer who successfully hits a bull’s eye because 
there was a lucky gust of wind. Had the lucky gust not been there, the archer wouldn’t have been 
successful (Pritchard 2010, p. 28). Any change in the wind conditions would have led to a failure. 
Here, the agent’s activity is not the decisive factor, but the gust is. So, a counterfactual evaluation 
might be apt for determining whether an activity is the decisive factor for realizing the outcome: 
One examines situations where the conditions are slightly varied while the activity is held fixed. If 
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there would be no difference in the outcome, the activity was the decisive factor. If there would be 
a difference, it was not. The outcome should be described in an agent relative way, such as the archer’s 
hitting the bull’s eye. 
We arrived at the following definition:  
 
COGNITIVE ACHIEVEMENT: The outcome of someone’s cognitive activity is a cognitive 
achievement iff (1) it is an accomplishment of the activity’s aim (broadly speaking), (2) it is a true 
belief, (3) the cognitive activity is an exercise of an ability relevant to accomplishing the outcome, 
and (4) the cognitive activity is the decisive factor for accomplishing the outcome. 
Pritchard argues that this definition is too inclusive to capture our ordinary notion of an 
achievement (Pritchard 2010, p. 68). Typically, achievements are praiseworthy. Successes resulting 
from en passant activities or easy successes, such as acquiring simple perceptual beliefs in good visual 
conditions, are typically not considered praiseworthy because of their ease; but this definition would 
not exclude them. Pritchard suggests that achievements in a strong sense can be accomplished in 
two ways (Pritchard 2010, p. 68): The success is gained by overcoming a significant obstacle to the 
relevant success, such as acquiring a true visual belief in low lighting, or the lack of difficulty is the 
result of training. An example is Sherlock Holmes’s rather effortless processing of his environment 
with respect to clues (Pritchard 2010, p. 72). In general, someone who exercises a significant level of 
ability achieves something even when the exercise is performed with ease. This gives us the 
following definition: 
 
COGNITIVE ACHIEVEMENT IN A STRONG SENSE (CAS): The outcome of someone’s cognitive 
activity is a cognitive achievement iff (1) it is an accomplishment of the activity’s aim (broadly 
speaking), (2) it is a true belief, (3) the cognitive activity is an exercise of an ability relevant to 
accomplishing the outcome, (4) the cognitive activity is the decisive factor for accomplishing the 
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outcome, and (5) the cognitive activity involves the application of a significant level of ability or3 the 
overcoming of a significant obstacle to the relevant success. 
As we have seen, intervening luck is incompatible with achievements. Pritchard claims, though, 
that achievements are compatible with so-called environmental luck. A paradigmatic case of such luck 
is Goldman’s barn-case (Goldman 1976): A man enters a country full of fake barns which all look 
like barns – unbeknownst to himself. If he then identifies a real barn as a barn, this seems to be 
mere luck. He could have easily classified a fake barn as a barn. His luck is environmental because it 
relates to the environment and is not due to an intervention in the exercise of his cognitive ability; his 
vision works fine. Pritchard claims that such luck is compatible with achievements precisely because 
nothing intervenes in the activity (Pritchard 2014, pp. 318-319). I don’t question this claim here. 
 
3  THESIS: KNOWLEDGE-WHY IS NOT A KIND OF CAS 
Pritchard argues that knowing that p is not a kind of CAS (2010, 2012, 2014): (K-THAT ≠ CAS). Here, 
I do not evaluate his arguments, but I briefly introduce them. His first argument is concerned with 
testimony. Following Jennifer Lackey (2007), Pritchard classifies ordinary cases of knowledge 
acquisition via testimony from a reliable and knowledgeable source as cases where the success of 
acquiring a true belief is not primarily creditable to the agent. Assume that Tina acquired the true 
belief that Julien has the hiccups via a reliable and knowledgeable source. Gaining this true belief is 
not primarily creditable to Tina. She must understand some sentences to acquire the belief, but that 
she ended up with having a true rather than a false belief is not primarily due to correctly 
understanding those sentences; it is because her informant was knowledgeable. Tina’s cognitive 
activity is thus not the decisive factor for accomplishing the outcome. Nonetheless, she gained 
                                                        
3 Pritchard seems to understand these options as exclusive (cf. Pritchard 2010, p. 68). But they are not: there 
are cases where skill and a significant level of ability are involved, e.g., a marathon victory by a skilled runner. 
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knowledge. Pritchard’s second argument is that knowledge-that is not compatible with environmental 
luck. For instance, coming to believe that there is a barn by seeing a real barn does not amount to 
knowing that there is a barn, due to the luck involved. By contrast, cognitive achievements are 
compatible with such luck.  
Pritchard’s arguments for the claim that knowledge-why is not a kind of CAS do not go further 
than his arguments for (K-THAT ≠ CAS). The reason is simple: Knowing why p is commonly 
analyzed as a form of knowledge-that. The content of knowing why p is analyzed in terms of true 
answers to the question ‘Why p?’.4 Answers to why-questions are typically said to be specific 
complex propositions of the form (X is the case because of Y) or (p because q), for some q (see, 
e.g., Grimm 2006, 2014; Pritchard 2008, 2014; Kelp 2014; Sliwa 2015; Riaz 2015; Hills 2016). Take 
Pritchard’s illustration (Pritchard 2008, p. 332): “[...] to know why my house burned down is just to 
know that it burned down because of (say) faulty wiring.” One can know why p by knowing 
different contents. Compare ‘Tom knows that (Julien has the hiccups because he ate his lunch 
quickly)’ and ‘Tina knows that (Julien has the hiccups because a reflex of his diaphragm was 
stimulated).’ Both know why Julien has the hiccups, but the content of their knowledge-why differs. 
In other words, there can be more than one correct answer as to why p. Assuming that ‘X is the 
case because of Y’ is interchangeable with ‘p because q,’ this gives us the following analysis:  
K-WHY (COMMON ANALYSIS): S knows why p iff for some q, S knows that (p because q). 
Since (p because q) propositions are just complex propositions, (p because q) knowledge is a 
form of knowledge-that. It can be acquired via testimony and is not immune to environmental luck. 
If so, (K-WHY ≠ CAS). 
                                                        
4 Knowledge-wh is typically analyzed in terms of true answers to the so-called embedded wh-question (see, 
e.g., Karttunen 1977; Groenendijk and Stokhof 1982; Higginbotham 1996; Stanley and Williamson 2001; 
Braun 2006; Schaffer 2009; Masto 2010; for an alternative account see, e.g., Brogaard 2009). 
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One possibility to rebut (K-WHY ≠ CAS) is to argue that (K-THAT ≠ CAS) is false (for an attempt 
that is concerned with knowledge-why see, e.g., Kelp 2014).5 However, I take (K-THAT ≠ CAS) for 
granted here. Another possibility is to argue that K-WHY (COMMON ANALYSIS) is false. But, to my 
knowledge, this objection has not been advocated.6 It seems plausible that knowing why p is to 
know that (p because q), for some q.7 If so, the only option left is to argue that (p because q) 
knowledge is a kind of CAS. This option becomes available when one considers in more detail what 
is required for (p because q) knowledge. It is precisely this matter that turns out to be crucial for 
evaluating (K-WHY ≠ CAS) and (U-WHY = CAS), as I show in what follows. 
4  THE EXPLANATORY STORY REQUIREMENT 
Pritchard claims that understanding-why requires the following (Pritchard 2014, pp. 322-323): 
[…] [I]n representing oneself as being in possession of an understanding of some event, no matter how 
limited, one is representing oneself as not merely being able to identify the cause of that event, but also 
as being able to offer a sound explanatory story regarding how cause and effect are related. 
The thesis that one must have a sound explanatory story for understanding-why is rather 
uncontroversial. I do not question it here. Instead, I am concerned with the distinction between 
identifying the cause and having an explanatory story. This distinction is crucial for Prichard’s 
arguments. He argues that having such an explanatory story is a kind of CAS, but that it is not 
                                                        
5 For general arguments for (K-THAT = CAS) see so-called robust virtue epistemology accounts (e.g., Zagzebski 
1996; Sosa 2007; Turri 2011; Greco 2012; Kelp 2014; Carter et al. 2015; Navarro 2015). 
6 Grimm argues that K-WHY (COMMON ANALYSIS) captures one kind of knowledge-why and that there is 
another kind of knowledge-why (Grimm 2014). However, he does not reject the common analysis. 
7 However, a full-fledged account of knowledge-why must deal with the following issues: (i) Some answers to 
why-questions have as their canonical form (p in order to q) propositions. So, one must show that for each (p 
in order to q) proposition there is an equivalent (p because q*) proposition, or one must define knowledge-
why more broadly. (ii) It has been argued that why-questions are inherently contrastive (e.g., van Fraassen 
1980, chapter 5). One must either refute this claim or take it into account. 
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required for (p because q) knowledge and thus not for knowledge-why. Grimm (2014), Kelp (2014), 
and Sliwa (2015) argue that having such an explanatory story is required for acquiring (p because q) 
knowledge. For evaluating these claims, it is important to elaborate on the explanatory story 
requirement. Pritchard does not go into detail. But I give a more precise account in this section.  
First of all, it is important to acknowledge that what we consider to be the cause is partially a 
context-dependent or subject-dependent matter, as Lewis famously claims (Lewis 1986, p. 162): 
The multiplicity of causes […] are obscured when we speak […] of the cause of something. […] If 
someone says that the bald tire was the cause of the crash, another says that the driver’s drunkenness 
was the cause, and still another says that the cause was the bad upbringing which made him so reckless, 
I do not think any of them disagree with me when I say that the causal history includes all three. They 
disagree only about which part of the causal history is most salient for the purposes of some particular 
inquiry.  
In one context, Julien eating his lunch quickly is the cause of his hiccups and in another one, it 
is the stimulation of his diaphragm.8 However, discussing the context-sensitivity of causal claims is 
not crucial here. In what follows, ‘the cause’ refers to some relevant causal factor.  
So, let us turn to the difference between identifying the cause of a phenomenon and having an 
explanatory story. Identifying the cause of a phenomenon is identifying some relevant causal factor. 
To state that some phenomenon is the cause of another phenomenon is typically understood as 
stating that the latter is causally dependent on the former. For instance, by stating that a stimulation of 
his diaphragm was the cause for Julien’s hiccups one states that the hiccups were causally dependent 
on the stimulation. The nature of causation is a controversial issue. However, it is typically assumed 
                                                        
8 One explanation is that causal claims are contrastive. Whether the bald tire or the driver’s drunkenness is the 
cause of the crash seems to depend on the contrast in question. The contrast might be that the driver had a 
crash with this car rather than with some other or that this driver rather than some other had a crash, etc. For 
details, see, e.g., Dretske 1977; Achinstein 1983, chapter 6; Hitchcock 1996; Schaffer 2013. 
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that causal dependencies are asymmetric; if Y is the cause of X, X is not the cause of Y. So, knowing 
that some phenomenon is the cause of another phenomenon comes with some information about 
the relation between cause and effect. But importantly, such information is just general information 
about phenomena in a causal relation. Having an explanatory story regarding how cause and effect 
are related goes beyond having general information about causality. Instead, such an explanatory 
story is tailored to the causal connections between the particular phenomena in question. As some 
decades of debates have shown, the precise nature of causal explanations is difficult to capture and 
there is no broad consensus on the horizon. However, for our purposes, we can abstract away from 
the differences between the various accounts of causal explanation. Bradford Skow introduces a 
helpful notion to characterize the essence of explanatory stories regarding how cause and effect are 
related, namely the notion of a so-called vertical follow-up question. Such a question is concerned with 
the connection between cause and effect. (Skow 2016, pp. 79-80): 
[We are] asking what the facts in the [causal] chain have done to belong in the chain. [...] Why did she 
[throw a rock]? Because Billy has been ignoring her again. What does that have to do with it? 
The ‘What does that have to do with it?’ question is vertical because it is concerned with the 
causal connections between the effect and its cause.9 Another example Skow uses is the statement ‘The 
rock hit the ground at a speed of 4.4 m/s because it was dropped from a height of one meter’ (cf. 
Skow 2016, p. 75). Here, the follow-up question is ‘What does the fact that the rock was dropped 
from a height of one meter have to do with the rock hitting the ground at a speed of 4.4 m/s?’ 
What is relevant for our initial question is that answers to the how-question ‘How are cause and 
effect related?’ are also answers to the vertical follow-up question. For instance, a description of the 
process that led from Billy’s ignoring Suzy to her throwing the rock is both an answer to the 
question ‘How are Billy’s ignoring Suzy and her throwing the rock related?’ as well as to the 
                                                        
9 The horizontal follow-up question in case of (p because q) is ‘Why q?’ (Skow 2016, pp. 79-80). 
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question ‘What does the fact that Billy has been ignoring Suzy have to do with her throwing the 
rock?’.10  
I thus suggest that the essence of an explanatory story regarding how cause and effect are 
related is an answer to the vertical follow-up question. The essence of an answer to such a question 
can also be characterized irrespective of a particular account of causal explanation. It can be 
characterized as describing facts or principles that establish the causal connections between the effect and the cause 
in question. Taking a pluralist stance on causal explanations, these can be, say, a description of the 
causal process that led from the cause to the effect, a description of the causal mechanism that produces 
the effect, or an application of a causal law. For instance, an answer to the vertical follow-up 
question regarding the impact speed of 4.4 m/s could consist of pointing out that it is in accordance 
with a law of gravitation that dropping a rock from a height of one meter results in a speed of 4.4 
m/s (cf. Skow 2016, p. 75). Since descriptions of causal processes or mechanisms can be more or 
less detailed, there could be more than one sound explanatory story.  
To sum up, identifying the cause is identifying the relevant causal factor. Having an explanatory 
story regarding how cause and effect are related is to have information about facts or principles that 
establish the causal (or, more generally, explanatory) connection between the phenomena in 
question.11 Pritchard claims that having such an explanatory story is not required for knowledge-
why. This has been contested. So, let us turn to this matter.  
                                                        
10 Skow considers vertical follow-up questions to be (equivalent to) particular why-questions, namely ‘Why is 
it the case that F is a reason why E happened?’ (cf. Skow 2016, p. 74). Pritchard varies between talking about 
how cause and effect are related and “[...] some conception of why introducing oxygen might cause the target 
chemical reaction [...]” (Pritchard 2014, p. 323). This varying between what, how, and why is commonplace 
in theories of explanations.  
11 As one reviewer emphasized, information about facts or principles that establish the explanatory 
connection is information about a subject matter. If so, understanding-why threatens to collapse into so-called 
objectual understanding, i.e., understanding of a subject matter, such as understanding Obama’s victory in 
2008 (for more on this topic, see., e.g., Kvanvig 2003, chapter 8; Elgin 2007; Grimm 2011; Carter and 
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5  KNOWLEDGE-WHY & THE EXPLANATORY STORY REQUIREMENT 
Given K-WHY (COMMON ANALYSIS), the relevant question is whether acquiring (p because q) 
information requires having an explanatory story regarding how cause and effect are related. 
Pritchard does not argue in detail why we should answer this question in the negative. In what 
follows, I first make a case for this claim, then I address Grimm’s, Kelp’s, and Sliwa’s objections, 
and I discuss consequences for an account of knowledge-why. Ultimately, (K-WHY ≠ CAS).  
5.1  THE POSITIVE CASE 
One example Pritchard uses to motivate the claim that knowledge-why does not require having an 
explanatory story regarding how cause and effect are related is as follows (Pritchard 2014, p. 316): 
Kate comes to know that it was the introduction of the oxygen which caused the chemical reaction not 
because she figured this out for herself, but because a fellow scientist, who has specialised expertise in 
this regard which our hero lacks, informs her that this is the cause of the reaction. […] Kate, while 
generally proficient in chemistry, does not have any sound epistemic grip on why the introduction of 
oxygen should have this effect on the substances in question. 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Gordon 2014; Baumberger and Brun 2017). However, such a (potential) collapse is an issue for all accounts 
that tie understanding-why to explanations. The expression ‘information about facts or principles that establish 
the explanatory connections between the phenomena’ is a characterization of the essence of any explanation 
that goes beyond identifying the cause. In the case of causal explanations such explanations are taken to be 
descriptions of complex phenomena, such as causal processes. I think this is why Catherine Elgin remarks 
that “[…] it is the conception of [objectual] understanding that is closely connected to explanation.” (Elgin 
2007, p. 35) It thus does not seem obvious to me whether the (potential) collapse is a threat. Instead, it needs 
to be discussed how similar understanding-why and objectual understanding are (see, e.g., Grimm 2011), or 
whether objectual understanding is explanatory understanding (see, e.g., Khalifa 2013). But this is not my 
agenda in this paper. 
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Kate knows that the cause of the chemical reaction is the introduction of oxygen, but she does 
not know how they are related.12 She could not answer the question ‘What does the fact that oxygen 
has been introduced have to do with the occurrence of the chemical reaction?’ Another prominent 
example Pritchard introduced is a scenario where a child learns via testimony from a fire officer that 
his or her house burned down because of faulty wiring, but not how the faulty wiring led to the 
house burning down (Pritchard 2008, p. 332). Grimm also provides us with a similar example: A car 
mechanic tells her customer that the cause of the gauges’ death is a bad ignition switch in her car, 
but not how the bad ignition switch led to the gauges’ failure (Grimm 2006, p. 531). The crucial 
point is that the respective subjects nonetheless seem to acquire (p because q) knowledge. Kate 
seems to know that (the chemical reaction occurred because oxygen had been introduced). The 
child seems to know that (the house burned down because there was faulty wiring). The car 
customer seems to know that (the gauges failed because there is a bad ignition switch). We can 
generate many similar cases. In addition, I suggest that there are similar cases that do not involve 
testimony. Imagine that a scientist applies reliable techniques to determine what a (or the) decisive 
causal factor for a chemical reaction is. Assume that her confident conclusion is that the 
introduction of oxygen was the decisive factor. Nonetheless, the scientist might still lack 
information about facts or principles that establish the causal connection between these 
phenomena. She might merely have some hypotheses. Importantly, to learn about a crucial part of a 
causal process before discovering other parts is common in science. 
The examples suggest that acquiring (p because q) information can come apart from having 
information about facts or principles that establish the explanatory connections between them. One 
can correctly believe that (the house burned down because there was faulty wiring) without 
ascertaining what facts or principles establish the connection between the faulty firing and the 
                                                        
12 Such knowledge-how is not a form of practical knowledge-how, such as knowing how to swim. It also 
seems clear that such knowledge-how can be spelled out in terms of propositional knowledge.  
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burnt-down house. This is in line with the fact that we typically employ (p because q) or (X is the 
case because of Y) propositions to just name the relevant causal factor, such as ‘The car accident 
happened because there were poor road conditions’ or ‘The car accident happened because of the 
poor road conditions.’ Such a claim just states that some relevant causal dependency between the p-
phenomenon and the q-phenomenon obtains. Since ‘because’ is also used for non-causal 
explanations, I follow proposals by Kim (1994), Greco (2014), and Grimm (2014) and speak of an 
explanatorily relevant dependency.  
Knowing that something is the case can come apart from knowing by virtue of what facts or 
principles it is the case. But this is not a peculiarity of (p because q) knowledge. Take different 
knowledge-that cases: Scientists can discover that some non-accidental generalization holds without 
knowing which facts or other generalizations it holds because of. One can know that Obama was 
elected to be the forty-fourth president of the US without knowing that this was due to the fact that 
he won 365 electoral votes, while his opponent received only 173. Likewise, one can know that 
faulty wiring was a causal factor for the house burning down without knowing by virtue of which 
facts or principles the faulty wiring caused the house to burn down.  
One might worry that this is too broad a conception of (p because q) information. What if one 
had a false belief about the relation between cause and effect? What if Suzy were to believe that the 
faulty wiring caused a fire in the living room although it caused one in the kitchen? Does Suzy 
nonetheless know that (the house burned down because there was faulty wiring)? That depends. If 
Suzy would understand the faulty wiring to be connected to wires in the living room, then she does 
not. In this case, Suzy would have a false belief about what the faulty wiring in question is. The q in 
her (p because q) proposition would then be false. But let us suppose that Suzy believes that there 
was faulty wiring somewhere in the house, and she knows that faulty wiring could lead to fire in 
several ways. In this case, the false belief that the faulty wiring caused a fire in the living room does 
not seem to undermine her knowledge that (the house burned down because there was faulty 
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wiring). Suzy is simply mistaken about how the faulty wiring led to the result. Similarly, a scientist 
can be mistaken about the details of the causal process of a chemical reaction and yet know that the 
introduction of oxygen caused it. Or one can know that Obama was elected to be the forty-fourth 
president despite falsely believing that this is because he won 400 electoral votes.  
Last but not least, what I am arguing is not that (p because q) information cannot contain an 
answer to some vertical follow-up question. Imagine that Suzy knows that (the house burned down 
because there was faulty wiring, which caused sparks that set the wooden walls of the house on fire, 
and nobody combated the flames). So, there are (p because q) constructions that merely express that 
some explanatorily relevant dependency obtains, and (p because q) constructions that also contain 
an answer to some vertical follow-up question. However, the crucial point is that not every (p 
because q) construction contains such an answer. 
5.2  OBJECTIONS 
I have just argued that acquiring (p because q) information does not require having an explanatory 
story regarding how cause and effect are related. Why might one doubt this? According to Grimm, 
it “[...] is not clear [that the subject] understands the content [that his house burned down because 
of the faulty wiring] well enough to actually believe it” (Grimm 2014, p. 332; similarly Sliwa 2015). 
One needs to grasp the relation between cause and effect at least somewhat in order to grasp a (p 
because q) proposition (Grimm 2014, p. 338). Kelp endorses Grimm’s arguments (Kelp 2014, p. 
349). Let us turn to the details.   
Sliwa is concerned with the fire scenario. She argues that “[i]n so far as it’s plausible to attribute 
to the child the knowledge that the house burned down because of faulty wiring, we do attribute 
some degree of understanding of why […]” (Sliwa 2015, p. 70). So, knowing that (the house burned 
down because there was faulty wiring) comes at least with having some rudimentary story regarding 
how cause and effect are related. She further argues that when one makes the case that the child 
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does not have any understanding-why, it seems clear that he or she also does not know that (the 
house burned down because there was faulty wiring) (Sliwa 2015, p. 70, italics omitted): 
Thus, suppose that the child truly hasn’t the faintest clue what faulty wiring could possibly be – from 
the child’s perspective the house burning down because of faulty wiring is compatible with its being 
struck by lightning, its being set on fire by someone, and its spontaneously erupting into flames. In this 
case, [...] the child does not [...] know that the house burned down because of faulty wiring. (He may, of 
course, know that it was something that the grown-ups call ‘faulty wiring’ that caused the fire – 
whatever that is.) 
This suggests that Sliwa’s objection is that having conceptually false ideas about how faulty wiring 
could lead to a house burning down prevents someone from knowing that (the house burned down 
because of faulty wiring). This sounds plausible to me. However, this objection is beside the point 
for two reasons (cf. Lawler 2016): First, arguably, knowing that (p because q) requires understanding 
what the terms involved mean. There are surely differences in understanding a term. But being able 
to at least roughly characterize what the terms involved mean is a minimal requirement for 
knowledge acquisition. To think that faulty wiring singled out as the causally essential factor is 
compatible with the house being struck by lightning, its being set on fire, or its spontaneously 
erupting into flames seems to be a case of not understanding what faulty wiring is. However, this is 
not the assumption in Pritchard’s fire scenario. It is assumed that the child knows at least roughly 
what faulty wiring is. The point of the fire scenario is that faulty wiring could lead to a fire in several 
ways and that merely knowing that faulty wiring was causally decisive does not amount to knowing 
which of these ways was realized in the particular case. Second, as Pritchard clarifies (Pritchard 2014, 
p. 321), it is not assumed that the subjects have no clue whatsoever about the relation between 
cause and effect. The subjects might well hypothesize how the cause might have caused the effect. 
The crucial point is that the subjects do not have “[...] a sufficient explanatory grip on how this 
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particular cause generated this particular effect” (Pritchard 2014, p. 322). They could not answer the 
vertical follow-up question.  
But what about Grimm’s objection? In his 2006 paper, Grimm introduced the car mechanic 
case I mentioned early. Here, the subject learns that the gauges’ failure is due to a bad ignition 
switch, but “[…] fails to grasp how a bad ignition switch might lead to this result” (Grimm 2014, p. 
531). In the main text, Grimm does not question that (p because q) knowledge is gained. However, 
in a footnote he explains why he believes that this is not the case (Grimm 2014, footnote 21, pp. 
531-532): 
[…] [I]n order to assent to a dependency claim along the lines of A because of B in a way that really 
amounts to assent (as opposed to just a mouthing of the words “A because of B”), one must possess 
[…] [a] sort of counterfactual manipulative ability [...]. 
He analyzes the required sort of counterfactual manipulative ability along Woodwardian lines 
(Grimm 2006, p. 532) 
[…] in terms of having an ability to answer “what-if-things-had-been-different?” questions. To have an 
ability to answer questions of this sort [...] is to be able to anticipate the sort of change that would result 
in the thing we want to explain [….] if the factors cited as explanatory […] were different in various 
ways. 
An answer to a what-if-things-had-been-different question seems to be an answer to a vertical 
follow-up question. One establishes the causal connection via examining counterfactual situations. 
In a later paper, Grimm specifies a minimal requirement for such answers (Grimm 2014, p. 338): 
[...] it is hard – perhaps impossible – to genuinely assent to [a (p because q) proposition] without in some 
way grasping that what it means for these two items to stand in the ‘because’ relation is that a change in 
the state of the former will lead to a change in the state of the later [sic] (ceteris paribus). 
  
18/33 
So, his claim is that to know that (p because q) one must have at least some grip on how the q-
phenomenon and the p-phenomenon are related: one has to know that if the former had been 
different, the latter would have been different. One has to know that “[...] if the wires had not been 
faulty – then the house would not have burned down (ceteris paribus)” (Grimm 2014, p. 337). 
Without such knowledge, a subject does not assent “[...] to the proposition that [the] house burned 
down because of the faulty wiring but rather a “nearby” proposition, such as that whatever the fire 
chief just said is true […].” (Grimm 2014, p. 338) 
Importantly, Grimm seems to be articulating different objections: One concerns a general causal 
belief that a change in the q-phenomenon will lead to some change in the p-phenomenon. This belief 
is not tailored to any particular phenomenon. The other one concerns the anticipation of the sorts of 
counterfactual changes that would affect the p-phenomenon if specific aspects of the q-
phenomenon were changed. This is tailored to the particular phenomena. Let me start with the first 
objection. It is akin to Sliwa’s worry insofar as it questions whether subjects in cases like the fire 
scenario properly understand the (p because q) proposition. If a counterfactual dependency is part of 
the nature of causal dependency, perhaps one must grasp the former to understand a (p because q) 
claim. My issue with Grimm’s objection is twofold: First, it is beside the point. Pritchard’s scenarios 
assume neither that the subjects do not understand in general what a causal dependency is nor that 
the subjects lack any hypothesis about what would happen if the q-phenomenon did not occur. The 
child might well hypothesize that the house would not have burned down if there had not been 
faulty wiring. But this would not change the cases. The child would nonetheless lack information 
about how the faulty wiring led to the house burning down. To put the point differently, it is not an 
answer to vertical follow-up question, but merely general information about causal dependencies, 
that (the p-phenomenon would not have occurred if the q-phenomenon had not occurred (ceteris 
paribus)). Second, Grimm disregards the challenge to his claim posed by cases of causal 
overdetermination or preemption (see, e.g., Schaffer 2003). In such cases, it is not true that the p-
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phenomenon would not have occurred if the q-phenomenon had not occurred (ceteris paribus). 
Cases of causal preemption are cases with a causal back-up. If A had not caused B, A’ would have. 
Cases of causal overdetermination occur when an effect is due to multiple causes that each alone would 
account for the effect. If Anne and Bob shoot Carl at the same time and either shot alone would 
have been lethal, Carl’s death is causally overdetermined. If Anne shot him but Bob would have 
done so otherwise, it is a case of causal preemption. The crucial question is whether the claim (Carl 
died because Anne shot him) is true in cases of preemption or overdetermination. I am strongly 
inclined to think that it is. Anne’s shot is a causally decisive factor for Carl’s death in both cases. If 
so, it is not the case that (p because q) information comes with information that (the p-phenomenon 
would not have occurred if the q-phenomenon had not occurred (ceteris paribus)).  
The second point is also relevant for Grimm’s second objection, which is the objection that one 
must be able to anticipate specific counterfactual changes for acquiring (p because q) information. If 
(p because q) propositions are compatible with overdetermination or preemption, such an ability 
could not be necessary for acquiring (p because q) information. Even when we put these unusual 
cases aside, the first objection does not look promising. Such a requirement seems clearly too 
demanding. Imagine that a causal process is so complex that it is difficult to know how the changes 
in some value lead or might fail to lead to changes in others (this example is inspired by Strevens 
2016). Think of the 2007-2008 financial crisis. It seems clear that it happened (inter alia) because of 
the bursting of a housing bubble in the United States. However, our financial market is so complex 
that laymen typically do not have any counterfactual manipulative knowledge regarding the crisis. 
Even experts can lack such manipulative knowledge. Nonetheless, it seems to be true that both 
laymen and experts know that (the financial crisis occurred because the housing bubble burst). If so, 
being able to anticipate specific counterfactual changes is not necessary for acquiring (p because q) 
information. 
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5.3  CONSEQUENCES FOR AN ACCOUNT OF KNOWLEDGE-WHY 
Let us take stock. I have argued that (p because q) information does not amount to having an 
explanatory story regarding how cause and effect are related. (p because q) information is typically 
just information that some explanatorily relevant dependency between the p-phenomenon and the q-
phenomenon obtains. Acquiring a (p because q) belief requires having a general conception about 
causal dependencies. However, it would not threaten Pritchard’s arguments for (K-WHY ≠ CAS) if we 
required such general beliefs. Understanding what the connectives in a sentence mean (here 
‘because’) is required for any belief acquisition. So, that a subject ends up with having a true rather 
than a false (p because q) belief in a testimony case is no more or less a cognitive achievement than 
in other cases of belief acquisition. So, if (K-THAT ≠ CAS), then (K-WHY ≠ CAS). 
In light of this discussion, one might question the common analysis of knowledge-why. 
Acquiring only knowledge that some explanatorily relevant dependency obtains might not be 
enough for acquiring knowledge-why. My worry is that such a conception of knowledge-why is too 
demanding to do justice to ordinary contexts. It would be odd to say that one knows the cause of 
an effect, but does not know why the effect occurred. Consider the statement ‘I know that (the 
house burned down because there was faulty wiring), but I do not know why it burned down,’ or 
‘Maria knows that (her grandfather died because he had stomach cancer), but she does not know 
why he died.’ Perhaps one could explain away the oddness of such statements or make a strong case 
for giving up the common analysis. However, I do not pursue this radical strategy here. Instead, I 
suggest an alternative for accommodating the impression that the knowledge-why that subjects like 
Kate, the child, or the customer gain is shallow, so to speak. Let us employ the concept of an 
explanatory story to identify two interesting variants of knowing why p: 
SHALLOW KNOWLEDGE-WHY: S has shallow knowledge why p iff for some q, (i) S knows that (p 
because q), but (ii) S lacks any relevant true belief about what establishes the explanatory 
connections between cause and effect.  
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NON-SHALLOW KNOWLEDGE-WHY: S has non-shallow knowledge why p iff for some q, (i) S knows 
that (p because q), and (ii) S knows what establishes the explanatory connections between cause and 
effect. 
Everyone who knows that (p because q), for some q, has knowledge-why. The notions of 
shallow and non-shallow knowledge-why are not meant to exhaust cases of knowledge-why. But 
they are by definition mutually exclusive because shallow knowledge-why demands lacking 
particular pieces of information. When philosophers of science speak about knowledge-why, they 
typically mean non-shallow knowledge-why. Paradigmatic scientific explanations tell us an 
explanatory story about the phenomena in question. Moreover, we would expect experts about a 
phenomenon to have non-shallow knowledge-why. Yet, shallow knowledge-why often suffices for 
the needs of everyday life.  
Given these concepts, a new thesis concerning CAS and the relation between knowledge-why 
and understanding-why arises. If Pritchard were right that having an explanatory story regarding 
how cause and effect is related is a kind of CAS, then (U-WHY = CAS) and (K-WHY (NON-SHALLOW)) 
= CAS). This does not render (K-WHY ≠ CAS) false, but it would be relevant for further exploring the 
relation between knowledge-why and understanding-why.13 So, let us turn to the question whether 
having such an explanatory story is a kind of CAS. 
6 UNDERSTANDING-WHY AND THE EXPLANATORY STORY REQUIREMENT 
Pritchard considers understanding-why to be a kind of CAS because having an explanatory story is 
such a kind. After presenting his argument, I discuss objections against it. I argue that most of them 
don’t succeed, but that they point to two kinds of counter-examples. Thus, (U-WHY ≠ CAS). 
                                                        
13 For those who worry that my account of non-shallow knowledge-why is a reductive account of understanding-
why in disguise: Non-shallow knowledge-why and understanding-why could differ in other respects. For 
instance, understanding-why might demand particular abilities (see, e.g., Hills 2016) or a particular cognitive 
attitude (see, e.g., Strevens 2013), etc. 
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6.1  PRITCHARD’S ARGUMENT 
Recall that Pritchard considers having a sound explanatory story regarding how cause and effect are 
related to be necessary for understanding-why. In other words, he demands answers to the vertical 
follow-up question for understanding-why. Recall further that there is typically not just one possible 
answer to this question. Pritchard accommodates this fact by claiming that “[...] understanding 
comes in degrees” (Pritchard 2014, p. 323). Writing about why one’s eyes water when chopping 
onions, he claims that “[...] one could imagine someone having a rudimentary grasp of how 
chopping onions can cause one’s eyes to water which suffices for a limited kind of understanding of 
the target event [...]” (Pritchard 2014, p. 323, my italics). So, while an answer to the follow-up 
question is necessary, a rudimentary answer suffices for limited understanding-why. Understanding-
why is supposed to involve the exercise of a significant level of ability or the overcoming of a 
significant obstacle because having an explanatory story involves the latter (Pritchard 2010, pp. 82-
83, my italics): 
Typically, [...] one gains understanding by undertaking an obstacle-overcoming effort to piece together 
the relevant pieces of information. Moreover, where understanding is gained with ease, this will be 
because of the fact that one is bringing to bear significant cognitive ability. Perhaps, for example, in 
coming across one’s house in flames one is immediately able to gain an understanding of why this event 
is occurring because one is able to observe some crucial feature of the event taking place before one 
which – along, say, with the relevant background information that one possesses – definitively indicates 
how this event came about in such a way as to afford one the relevant understanding. But here the spontaneity 
of the understanding is entirely due to the exercise of significant cognitive ability [...]. 
It seems plausible that having an explanatory story regarding how cause and effect are related 
requires putting together the relevant pieces of information. Having an explanatory story does not 
amount to believing any bunch of propositions; they have to be interrelated propositions. Imagine 
someone who knows several propositions describing the causal process at hand, but doesn’t know 
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how they are related. This person does not have an explanatory story until she pieces the 
propositions together in the correct way. Pritchard’s claim is that when the piecing together comes 
with ease it is because of the application of a significant level of ability and when it does not come 
with ease it involves overcoming a significant obstacle. For instance, a chemist can put together an 
explanatory story for a chemical reaction with less effort than a pupil. Having an explanatory story, 
and thus understanding-why, count as cognitive achievements due to this indispensable exercise of 
the agent’s cognitive ability. The piecing together cannot be achieved solely via testimony; it “[...] is 
not the kind of epistemic standing that one can acquire by for the most part trusting the word of 
another (no matter how authoritative one’s informant is)” (Pritchard 2014, p. 320). So, in the case 
of having an explanatory story, all requirements for a CAS seem to be fulfilled: The outcome of the 
piecing together is an accomplishment of the activity’s aim, it is a true belief, and the cognitive 
activity, i.e., the piecing together of information, is an exercise of a relevant ability, is the decisive 
factor for the outcome, and it involves the application of a significant level of ability or the 
overcoming of a significant obstacle. 
It is because of the indispensable exercise that Pritchard further claims that understanding-why 
is compatible with environmental luck. One can gain understanding-why in environmental luck 
situations because “[...] the cognitive success, while lucky, is [...] primarily creditable to the cognitive 
agency of the subject” (Pritchard 2014, p. 319). So, in the country full of fake barns it is possible to 
gain understanding-why, although not knowledge. 
6.2  OBJECTIONS 
Carter and Gordon raise two objections to the claim that having an explanatory story and thus 
understanding-why is a CAS (Carter and Gordon 2014): (1) Piecing together the relevant 
information does not always involve a similar level of difficulty. (2) In some cases, merely average 
abilities or average effort is required. Their first argument features a case of what they dub easy 
understanding (Carter and Gordon 2014, p. 5): Someone understands why the tumble-dryer stopped 
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working by noticing that it was unplugged. There is not a significant obstacle because “[...] one can 
work out quite easily why the tumble-dryer stopped working” (ibid.). They contrast this case with a 
case where someone understands a complex theory and conclude: “[...] clearly the piecing together 
of information required for understanding-why does not always involve the same (or even a similar) 
kind of obstacle [...]” (ibid.). This is supposed to be a problem for Pritchard for the following reason 
(ibid.): 
The grounds for [his] view look shaky if it turns out that the piecing together of information required 
for understanding-why does not always involve a similar level of difficulty. After all, if it doesn’t, then 
there’s little motivation for the position that there is some level of difficulty involved in the piecing 
together of information required for understanding-why that can’t be overcome easily except by one 
with significant skill. 
This objection is unconvincing: First, it is unproblematic that piecing together information can 
involve dissimilar obstacles. CAS is a threshold concept; it only matters that there is some significant 
obstacle. Second, Pritchard does not demand a significant skill but the exercise of a significant level 
of ability. These are crucially different requirements. Arguably, a significant skill is a remarkable 
skill. By contrast, even ordinary abilities can have a significant level. Consider the ability of carrying 
furniture. This is not a remarkable skill, but there are different levels to the ability. Someone who 
carries furniture for the first time typically does not have a significant level of the ability. 
Experienced furniture movers typically do. If they exercise their ability with ease, they achieve 
something by carrying furniture. One might object that having a significant level of ability is just a 
different expression for having a skill. For instance, it seems apt to say that experienced furniture 
movers – but not first-time movers – have a skill of carrying furniture. However, if this were 
correct, this would not threaten my point. There would still be a difference between a significant skill 
and a skill. Then, my objection would be that Pritchard’s account only demands a skill but not a 
significant one.  
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Third, it is implausible that no significant obstacle is involved in Carter and Gordon’s case. 
Discovering that the dryer was unplugged only provides someone with an understanding-why the 
tumble-dryer stopped working if she can answer the vertical follow-up question. In order to do that 
one must apply one’s knowledge about how dryers, outlets, cables, and electricity are connected. 
This application of knowledge seems so ordinary that we typically don’t mention it. But it must 
nonetheless be applied. So, there is a significant obstacle involved. When the overcoming comes 
with ease, one applies a significant level of ability. Compare someone who learns for the first time 
how dryers work with someone who knows a lot about them.  
Carter and Gordon’s second argument features a case of what they dub shallow understanding. 
They imagine a novice fire officer who can easily give a coarse-grained explanation for why a house 
burned down. The officer’s understanding is shallow because the explanation is not very rich or 
detailed. As they argue, coming up with such an explanation only requires average intellectual effort 
or ability (Carter and Gordon 2014, p. 6). According to them, this is a problem for Pritchard 
because he is committed to the claim that (Carter and Gordon 2014, pp. 4-5, italics omitted): 
[...] the obstacle of piecing together the information relevant to acquiring understanding-why [...] is an 
obstacle not easily overcome for one with merely average ability. For if it were, then we couldn’t infer 
from the fact that one didn’t overcome a significant obstacle in attaining understanding-why, that, 
therefore, she must have exhibited significant skill. [...] [So,] [...] the piecing together of information 
needed for understanding-why is akin to a difficult golf shot. 
My issue with this objection is twofold: First, requiring that the relevant obstacle must be 
significant to accomplish a CAS does not imply that the obstacle cannot be easily overcome by an 
agent with merely average ability or effort. That would be too strong a demand. Achievements are 
defined agent relatively. I, for instance, have at best average abilities when it comes to playing billiards. 
But it nonetheless took me training to acquire these average abilities. When I hit any ball with a cue 
this should count as an achievement in the strong sense, even though it only requires average 
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abilities. Second, the requirement that the obstacle should be akin to a difficult golf shot does not seem 
merited, given Pritchard’s motivation for introducing the strong achievement notion. That notion 
only precludes that one overcomes the significant obstacle with ease without applying a significant 
level of ability. But there is space between ‘with ease’ and ‘difficult.’ Easy achievements can be 
excluded without demanding a difficult obstacle. Raising one’s arm in normal conditions involves a 
non-significant obstacle, but does not demand the application of a significant level of ability.  
So, Carter and Gordon’s objections are rebutted. But keep the example of coarse-grained 
explanations in mind. I explain below why they nonetheless do pose a problem.  
Grimm argues that cases featuring the simple (p because q) propositions mentioned earlier, like 
‘The house burned down because there was faulty wiring,’ are counter-examples to Pritchard’s 
thesis because they can be acquired solely via testimony (Grimm 2012, p. 111): Someone who 
understands why the house burned down can “[...] come to share his understanding of why the 
house burned down” by telling someone else that it burned down because there was faulty wiring. 
So, one can gain understanding-why via testimony. If Pritchard’s testimony-objection is correct, 
understanding-why is thus not a kind of CAS. Whiting gives a similar argument. He argues that the 
subject does not have to piece together the (p because q) information herself, but can acquire it 
pieced together via testimony (Whiting 2012, p. 222). 
Although they are right that a (p because q) proposition can be acquired as whole via testimony, 
this objection is not promising. According to Pritchard, in such cases no understanding-why has 
been gained. As we have seen, merely knowing that (the house burned down because there was 
faulty wiring) does not come with an answer to the vertical follow-up question. So, from Pritchard’s 
point of view, no understanding-why has been gained. Grimm and Whiting could either deny that 
answering the follow-up question is necessary for understanding-why or deny that there is (p 
because q) knowledge without information about the explanatory relation. The first option would 
  
27/33 
reject a widespread assumption, and so would presumably leave us quarreling about intuitions. The 
second option has been rebutted in section 5.  
Yet, Grimm’s and Whiting’s testimony objection can be combined with Carter and Gordon’s 
second example to generate a real counter-example: Recall that Pritchard allows for limited 
understanding-why which is based on rudimentary explanations for why p. Imagine that a reliable 
and knowledgeable person tells Tina a rudimentary explanatory story of how the chopping of 
onions led to watering eyes: The chopping of onions released an irritant gas which stimulates tears. 
Acquiring the content of such knowledge should fulfill Pritchard’s condition for limited 
understanding-why, because the subject acquires an answer to the vertical follow-up question. It 
seems also clear that such a rudimentary explanation can be fully acquired via testimony. Such an 
explanation is so simple that understanding it does not require more than understanding a complex 
sentence (in contrast, perhaps, to understanding complex explanations). If so, understanding-why 
can be acquired solely via testimony; and so is not a kind of CAS. 
Pritchard could argue that limited understanding-why is not understanding-why proper. But 
Whiting gives an example that points to another counter-example (Whiting 2012, p. 220):  
I see my son knocking a glass of milk and spilling its contents on to the floor. I thereby come to 
understand why there is milk on the floor – because my son knocked the glass and spilled the milk on 
to the floor. 
Grimm provides a similar example: the inkwell spilled because it got struck (Grimm 2012, p. 
111, footnote 32). What is noticeable about such cases? According to Whiting (2012, p. 220), 
[i]n this case, I do not even have to put two and two together; that is, I do not have to find the link 
between my son’s actions and the spilled milk; I simply see the spilling of the milk. The degree of 
cognitive ability exercised here is negligible. 
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I do not think that this is the right diagnosis. One must identify the link between the action and 
the milk on the floor. In Whiting’s example the linking is just done very quickly. For a contrast, 
imagine that one notices the son’s action en passant and later wonders about the milk on the floor. 
Here, the putting together might take longer. Whiting’s and Grimm’s examples are problematic for 
Pritchard’s thesis for a different reason: a very simple causal connection is involved. It is so simple that 
the answer to the vertical follow-up question can be acquired effortlessly. How spilling milk on the 
floor explains why there is milk on the floor is a very simple story. Putting together such a story 
does not involve a significant obstacle and it can be acquired solely via testimony.  
To sum up, understanding-why is not a kind of cognitive achievement in the strong sense 
because in cases of limited understanding-why and understanding-why featuring very simple causal 
connections, having a relevant explanatory story is not a cognitive achievement in a strong sense. 
Thus, (U-WHY ≠ CAS) and (K-WHY (NON-SHALLOW)) ≠ CAS). 
7 A LESSON TO DRAW: WHAT SETS UNDERSTANDING-WHY APART FROM 
KNOWLEDGE-WHY? 
As we have seen, being a kind of cognitive achievement in a strong sense is not a feature that sets 
understanding-why apart from knowledge-why. It seems that (K-WHY ≠ CAS) and (U-WHY ≠ CAS). 
Ordinary knowledge-why and shallow knowledge-why are not a kind of CAS because they can be 
acquired solely via testimony. Non-shallow knowledge-why involves the same epistemic grip 
Pritchard singles out as the reason why understanding-why is a kind of CAS. So, if understanding-
why is such a kind, non-shallow knowledge-why is one, too. Yet, cases of rudimentary explanations 
or cases of very simple causal connections show that neither non-shallow knowledge-why nor 
understanding-why is a kind of cognitive achievement in a strong sense. They can also be acquired 
solely via testimony.  
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Although being a kind of cognitive achievement is not a distinguishing feature, I made the case 
for a distinguishing feature throughout the paper: If knowing why p is to know that (p because q), 
for some q, the minimal condition for understanding-why and knowledge-why with respect to their 
contents is not identical. Knowing why p requires information that some explanatorily relevant 
dependency obtains. Understanding why p additionally requires information about the principles or 
facts that establish the explanatory connections between the phenomena in question. In other 
words, whereas understanding why p requires an answer to the vertical follow-up question, knowing 
why p does not.  
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